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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ex rel. Mauer v. Jackson,35 where the defendant pleaded guilty to the offenses
of attempted robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree, the Court
of Appeals held that concurrent sentences could be imposed.
The Court rested their decision on dual grounds. It was first held that
robbery, and assault with the intent to kill are separate acts which may command
separate punishments, thus rendering section 1938 inapplicable. Here it was
pointed out that although a simple assault merges with the act of robbery,3 0 an
assault with the intent to kill is a separate and distinct act since such an intent
is not a necessary element of the crime of robbery.37
Secondly, and most notably, the Court held that concurrent sentences do
not impose a double punishment on the defendant.3 s The Court felt that such
sentences merge into a single punishment measured by the sentence for the
highest grade offense. It was pointed out that section 1938 condemns only
multiple punishment and is silent as to multiple convictions and concurrent
sentences.
Defendant contended that concurrent sentences effected a double punishment
since his chances for parole would be injured.39 The Court rejected this, saying
that even without concurrent sentences the record of multiple convictions would
appear on defendant's record.
The practical effect of the above decision is to restrict the operation of
section 1938 to cases involving 'consecutive rather than concurrent sentences.
It is also noteworthy that this interpretation helps to insure against the defendant
going unpunished if an error is found in the conviction for the highest degree
crime.
Appeal And Error
Section 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states, "After hearing the
appeal, the court must give judgment, without regard to technical errors or
defects or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
35. 2 N.Y.2d 259, 159 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1957).
36. Zovick v. Eaton, 259 App. Div. 585, 20 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3rd Dep't 1940);
Richardson v. Morhaus, 182 Misc. 299, 43 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
37. N.Y. PENAL LAW §2124 provides:
Robbery in first degree. An unlawful taking or compulsion,
if accomplished by force or. . . when committed by a person:
1. Being armed with a dangerous weapon ....
38. This is an apparent reversal of the Court's former position In affirming
lower court cases holding contra: People v. Nelson, 309 N.Y. 231, 128 N.E.2d
391 (1955); People v. Goggin, 281 N.Y. 611, 22 N.E.2d 174 (1939).
39. This argument has been accepted in other jurisdictions. People v. Craig,
17 Cal.2d 453, 110 P.2d 403 (1941).
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Under this section the question of substantial rights is not the abstract question
of guilt or innocence; a guilty man being in any event entitled to a fair trial. 40
Error affects substantial rights when it can be said that it tended ;o influence
the verdict.41
In the cases of People v. Ochs42 and People v. Mende, 43 the Court reversed
convictions and ordered new trials on the grounds that in each case the substantial
rights of the defendants had been affected. In both cases the Court felt that
although the evidence was sufficient to find the defendants guilty, they had been
deprived of a fair trial. In the former case the Court held that it was improper
for the trial judge to include in the charge to the jury his opinion on the credibility
of the defendant as an interested witness. In the latter case the Court held that
it was improper for the trial judge to question defendant's witnesses in such a
manner as to indicate a communicable disbelief of their testimony.
In the case of People v. LaMarca,4 4 the Court affirmed a conviction on the
grounds that the errors alleged were technical and not reversible errors. The
Court held that although it may be error for a trial judge to fail to answer a
question propounded by the jury,45 after a full and proper charge has been given,
that error will not be reversible unless there is a serious prejudice to the
defendant's rights in the failure or refusal to answer the question. The Court
also held that it was not error for the trial judge to fail to charge as to lesser
degrees of homicide, since such a charge need not be given in a felony murder
prosecution unless called for by the evidence.
The purpose of section 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to do
away with reversals upon technical errors which really had not affected the
result,40 or infringed upon the fundamental right to a fair and impartial trial.47
Not only error, but harm to the defendant, must be shown to justify the reversal
of a judgment of conviction.4" Where the trial judge makes direct comments
which are unfair and prejudicial to the defendant, the defendant is dearly not
given a fair trial 40 Whether a defendant is deprived of a fair trial because of
40. People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N.Y. 411, 139 N.E. 558 (1923).
41. People v. Gerdvine, 210 N.Y. 184, 104 N.E. 129 (1914).
42. 3 N.Y.2d 54, 163 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1957).
43. 3 N.Y.2d 120, 164 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1957).
44. 3 N.Y.2d 452, 165 N.YS.2d 753 (1957).
45. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §427; People v. Gonzales, 293 N.Y. 259, 56 N.E.2d
574 (1944).
46. People v. Cummins, 209 N.Y. 283, 103 N.E. 169 (1913); People v. Bailey,
215 N.Y. 711, 109 N.E. 1086 (1915).
47. People v. Becker, 210 N.Y. 274, 104 N.E. 396 (1914); People v. De
Martino, 252 App. Div. 476, 299 N.Y.Supp. 781 (2d Dep't 1938).
48. People v. Youns, 151 N.Y. 210, 45 N.E. 460 (1896); People v. Patrick,
182 N.Y. 131, 74 N.E. 843 (1905).
49. People v. Corey, 157 N.Y. 332, 51 N.E. 1024 (1898); People v. Scaringi,
241 App. Div. 883, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1079 (2d Dep't 1934).
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questions asked by a trial court is a closer issue, as indicated by the dissent in
People v. Meandes. It is often a necessary and proper function of a trial judge
to take part in the examination of a witness to elicit significant facts, to clarify
issues or to facilitate the orderly progress of the trial5 0 But the trial judge must
refrain from asking questions in such a way as to disclose his opinion on the
merits or indicating a doubt on his part as to credibility of witnessess.5 ' Under
section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a trial judge may not decline to
answer jury's request for further instructions, but not every failure to answer
jury's questions constitutes reversible error.5 2 It is only where the court fails to
give information requested on a vital point, or where the failure to answer does
substantial harm to the defendant, that an appellate court may not disregard the
error.
53
Coram Nobis
The writ of error coram nobis will be granted upon a showing that a convic-
tion was obtained by coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or in any situation where
the defendant has been convicted without a preservation of his constitutional
rights, and this does not appear on the record.54 It is also a proper remedy to void
a conviction where it is established that the defendant had been mentally incom-
petent at the time of his arraignment.55 In People v. Sullivan,56 People v.
Smyth,5 7 People v. Silvermant8 and People v. Shapiro,5 the Court of Appeals
added both clarity and confusion to the problems surrounding the ancient writ.
In People v. Sullivan,60 defendant contended that the failure of the trial clerk
to ask him, after his plea of guilty, whether he had legal cause to show why judg-
ment should not be rendered, was such a denal of due process as to permit use
of the writ of error coram nobis.6' The Court denied this claim, and declared that
50. People v. Ohanian, 245 N.Y. 227, 157 N.E. 94 (1927.)
51. People v. Mulvey, 1 A.D.2d 541, 151 N.Y.S.2d 587 (4th Dep't 1956);
People v. Pecoraro, 177 App. Div. 803, 164 N.Y. Supp. 1058 (2d Dep't 1917); People
v. Kachadourian, 116 N.Y.S.2d 486 (County Ct. 1952).
52. People v. Gezzo, 307 N.Y. 385, 121 N.E.2d 380 (1954); People v. Lay, 279
N.Y. 737, 18 N.E.2d 686 (1938).
53. People v. Gonzales, 293 N.Y. 259, 56 N.E.2d 574 (1944); People v.
Shapiro, 285 N.Y. 581. 33 N.E.2d 250 (1941); People v. Wilkie, 286 App. Div. 835,
142 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1st Dep't 1955).
54. People v. Sadness, 300 N.Y. 69, 89 N.E.2d 188 (1949). See I BUFFALO L.
REV. 272 (1952) for a good discussion of the history of the writ of coram nobis
in New York.
55. People v. Boehm, 309 N.Y. 362, 368, 130 N.E.2d 897, 900 (1955).
56. 3 N.Y.2d 196, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1957).
57. 3 N.Y.2d 184, 165 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1957).
58. 3 N.Y.2d 200, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1957).
59. 3 N.Y.2d 203, 165 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1957).
60. See note 56, supra.
61. Defendant relied upon section 480 of the CODE OF CVIMINAL PROCzDUnE
which declares:
When the defendant appears for judgment, he must be
asked by the clerk whether he has any legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced.
